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ABSTRACT 
In countries where the government encourages “donations” and “gifts” from private 
companies, FDI firms are more likely than their domestic counterparts to engage in 
corrupt forms of political influence, known as State Captures. Different types of 
foreign investors engage in particular types of corruption, depending on what 
competitive advantage they will get out of it. FDI firms with local partners are more 
likely to engage in State Capture. Larger multinational firms with headquarters 
overseas rely much less on State Capture, yet are more likely to resort to political 
corruption and bribery, Kickbacks, in their dealing with foreign governments. Though 
quite often, foreign direct investors might claim that they are specifically targeted for 
bribes by local governments, it has been found that there is no evidence that FDI 
firms pay higher overall bribes than domestic firms, even though they are more likely 
to engage in specific forms of corruption. 
 
KEY WORDS: Corruption, competitiveness and FDI. 
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RESUMEN 
En los países donde los gobiernos fomentan las “donaciones” o “regalos” por parte 
de las empresas privadas, éstas tienen más posibilidades de verse implicadas en 
algún tráfico de influencias, conocido como Capturas Estatales. Es el caso de 
inversores extranjeros que se ven envueltos en actos de corrupción, dependiendo 
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del coste de oportunidad que tengan que asumir. Si bien es cierto que las empresas 
multinacionales más potentes son menos proclives a incurrir en la Captura Estatal, 
éstas son más propensas a caer en la corrupción política y en la compra de favores 
en sus tratos con los gobiernos anfitriones. Ha habido casos en los inversores 
extranjeros han hecho público su malestar por chantajes de los que han sido objeto 
por parte de los gobiernos regionales o locales de los países anfitriones. Por otro 
lado, muy difícilmente se puede demostrar que las empresas extranjeras pagan 
“comisiones” (en términos coloquiales se refiere a las mordidas) más elevadas que 
sus homólogas locales, si bien éstas han mostrado una mayor tendencia a aceptar 
diversas formas específicas de corrupción. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Corrupción, competitividad e inversión extranjera directa. 
 
1. CORRUPTION BEHAVIOUR AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON 
 
Corruption can be defined as a lack of integrity seen in some who have positions of 
trust. This phenomenon has been seen in many different societies and on many 
different social levels. From the highest public servants to civilians in companies, 
corrupt acts such as bribery and payoffs have been seen. Unfortunately, not only is 
the problem of bribery one that most would deem unethical, it leads only to short term 
gains for a few while denying long term gains for many. In particular, corruption can 
hinder the development of nations around the world. 
 
The main problem with corruption is that it creates an unfair advantage in such 
sectors as business. This leads to a big controversy, for many people believe that 
competition must be based on an equal level. However, there is a percentage of the 
population that believe that corruption is simply a part of the status quo, something 
that needs to be engaged in as a means of gaining efficiencies in business. 
Therefore two different positions are taken with regard to this subject: some see 
corruption as unfair in competition and others see it merely as a need for business 
(Abed and Hamid, 2006). There is a third position, which englobes those who rate 
various corrupt acts in terms of their level of right or wrong (Alesina and Weder, 
2007). Depending on the situation, its background, and other external and internal 
factors, society views certain acts as correct or not. In those cases ethics are what 
influence people’s decisions to condemn whether an act is corrupted or not. 
 
Nations that are known for high levels of corruption may face major difficulties in 
being able to gain Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (OECD, 2010). Obviously, when a 
nation has a reputation for corruption outsiders might exercise extreme caution in 
investing in the country. Moreover, and perhaps more important is that a nation that 
has a reputation for corruption might be disregarded altogether. In turn, the lack of 
FDI can cost a nation in terms of potential tax revenues, jobs and other benefits that 
come with new ventures in a nation. 
 
It is difficult to believe that there are no societies less corrupt than the United States 
(U.S.) which is massively being accused of corrupting less developed countries 
(LDCs) governments and societies, especially in its immediate sphere of influence. 
There are many costs for a nation that accompany corruption, these costs can be 
divided into four sections: i) economic; ii) political; iii) environmental; and iv), social. 
Economically corruption leads to the reduction of national wealth, for many public 
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officials demand bribes of the citizens on a monthly basis, and government officials 
would rather sign large high-profile deals such as dams, power plants, and refineries 
for they earn larger commissions on these projects, and leave more necessary 
infrastructure projects as schools, hospitals and roads on the side. Furthermore, in 
the economy of a nation, corruption hinders the development of fair market structures 
as well as equal competition, creating great costs for its nation. 
 
Politically corruption damages a nation’s reputation irrevocably. If a country is not 
perceived as democratic this influences its relations with all other countries. Offices, 
institutions and public servants lose all of their legitimacy when they misuse their 
power for their private advantage. Corruption is even more harmful in developing 
countries for an accountable political leadership cannot develop in a corrupt climate. 
Environmental degradation can also a consequence of corruption (López and Mitra, 
2002; Weitzel and Berns, 2006). The lack of rules and regulations and the 
greediness of public servants in developing countries has allowed the North 
(developed countries) to export its polluting industry South (developing nations) and 
destroy the nature. Environmentally devastating projects are given preference in 
funding, because they are easy targets for draining off public money into private 
pockets. 
 
Norms and values are context-bound and vary across cultures. Gift-giving is part of 
negotiating and relationship building in some parts of the world. But cultural relativism 
ends where the Swiss bank account enters the scene. It is a matter of degree: there 
are limits in all cultures beyond which an action becomes corrupt and unacceptable. 
The President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obsanjo (1994), commented that, in African 
tradition, “a gift is made in the open for all to see, never in secret. Where a gift is 
excessive, it becomes an embarrassment, and is returned”. 
 
A big gap between government and citizens accentuates the possibility of corruption 
occurring for fraudulency is a tool used to direct public procedures to one’s own 
favour, to get around administrative norms, to cut down uncertainty in decision 
making, to cut through bureaucratic paperwork, etc. Scholarly and peer reviewed 
research on corruption varies a great deal as researchers have approached the issue 
of corruption in many ways. The review of the available literature reveals that there 
are many studies in the general topic of corruption. Moreover, research has been 
undertaken in terms of corruption and FDI. However, by and large, the research has 
failed to address the relationship between corruption and decision-making as well as 
the behaviour of foreign firms in host countries that have a reputation for being 
corrupt (see Grossman and Helpman, 2001; Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2006; 
Blonigen, 2006). 
 
In order to gain a stronger understanding of the context of the study a review of the 
literature is needed to understand what is known about corruption, FDI, decision-
making and foreign investors in host countries. A review of the literature allows one 
to determine potential gaps in scholarly research that can be filled through new 
studies. Yet while a body of research has been found relating to corruption there are 
limitations with regard to the research (see Rodriguez et.al., 2006). However, as 
foreign firms entered foreign nations while new forms were created within developing 
nations, both managers and scholars became more aware of the magnitude of 
corruption as well as the need to not only comprehend it, but take action in terms of 
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it. Still, even though researchers from a wide range of social science disciplines, like 
Elliot (2002) and Gordon and Maiko (2003), have started to examine corruption and 
fill the gap in terms of an absence of research and literature, these efforts are 
minimal overall, leading to the need for additional research in this area. 
 
There have been numerous frameworks utilized to examine corruption. According to 
Shleifer and Vishny (2004) such frameworks have included industrial economic 
views, resource dependency theory as well as institutional theory. Moreover, the 
literature on corruption has been based on several sections of the social sciences 
where scholars within the disciplines have attempted to address views and objectives 
of their respective disciplines. Each field, Shleifer and Vishny has focused on a few 
central questions about corruption. The authors reveal that little attention has been 
paid to the interrelationships that exist between multinational corporations, policy 
makers, local populations, and managers. This means that there is a lot of space 
available for additional research, which is one of the aims of this article. 
 
On a broad level the research on corruption has shown that this phenomenon is a 
major problem to the world economies. In fact, according to Weitzel and Berns 
(2006) corruption has been recognized not only as a global phenomena but one 
worth one trillion U.S. dollars annually. Question: The trillion figure is in U.S. or in 
international terminology, as they tend to differ. This amount represents several 
forms of bribery including the theft of public assets, nepotism and corrupt leakages 
from public budgets. Moreover, Weitzel and Berns report that corruption has widely 
been acknowledged as one of the foremost problems in the developing world, 
followed by needlessly complex bureaucratic procedures. 
 
Corruption has been examined in terms of many nations such as in Minix Pei’s 
(2006) discussion of corruption in China. Pei argues in his research that even with a 
major economic boom seen in China, the nation has experienced many problems 
including waste, the lack of reform and corruption. With specific regard to corruption, 
Pei asserts that corruption is rampant in China and is seen in several forms such as 
patronage and nepotism. Many sectors of the economy have been characterized by 
corruption, such as power, tobacco, financial services, banking and infrastructure. 
Meanwhile, the country-specific approach has also addressed one of the most well 
known nations for corruption, Nigeria. According to Herbst (1996), this country has 
been negatively affected by corruption and even though the nation having strong 
leaders, the nation is failing due to the problem of corruption. Herbst argues that the 
failure of Nigeria in terms of being a viable economy is about corruption, not 
competence. However, like Pei, Herbst fails to reveal a relationship between 
corruption and FDI. 
 
Herbst does make a strong case for the potential of the Nigerian economy. Similar to 
Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea is a nation that has oil reserves and thus a potential for a 
strong economy, particularly in today’s oil market. However, as Blum (2005) explains 
numerous leaders of Nigeria have stolen from the country. And, with the government 
being critical in the development of the economy, the economy struggles as a result 
of corruption. Nigeria has become a nation where corruption is seen as a norm, or 
simply a part of doing business in the nation. Other researchers have also focused 
on Nigeria as a nation that faces corruption such as de Costa (1996), who argues 
that there is nothing that cannot be bought in the country. Corruption, de Costa 
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further reveals is found in many realms such as in areas where the government pays 
employees low wages. 
 
In addition to the country specific studies related to corruption researchers have also 
examined the consequences of corruption. Werlin (2005) explores the relationship 
between corruption and its effect on the environment. In Nigeria, corruption has 
affected the environment in that money allocated to solid waste management was not 
used appropriately. In fact, the World Bank, the primary global lending institution that 
aids many Third World, impoverished nations, lent Nigeria over one hundred million 
dollars for improving its solid waste operations. However, despite the massive loan, 
only one third of the daily trash has been collected. Clearly, the research shows that 
corruption can negatively impact the environment (see Fredriksson, List and Millimet, 
2005). 
 
However, on a broader level, corruption also affects the functioning of economies. 
For instance, it can be argued that corruption can aggravate problems of income 
inequality. Bahre (2005) argues that corruption is the largest obstacle to both social 
development and economic development. Bahre also reports that within the realm of 
social development, corruption can harm efforts of improving health as well as the 
efforts put into providing effective education of children of corruptive nations. 
 
Scholarly research has examined corruption as it relates to FDI. However, the 
research has not examined companies that have entered nations to do business 
despite knowing the fact that these countries are corrupted. For example, Cuervo 
(2006) has argued that host country corruption discourages FDI and asserts that 
some companies exposed to corruption in their home nations might seek to invest in 
countries where corruption occurs. This, it might be suggested, relates to how some 
see corruption as a norm and a part of the status quo needed to gain efficiencies in 
conducting business activities. 
 
Meanwhile, researchers have also examined corruption in terms of causes and 
effects with regard to FDI. Researchers Zhao, Kim and Du (2003) studied forty 
nations over a seven-year period with the data revealing that a high level of 
corruption as well as a low level of transparency can work against gaining inward 
FDI. The authors focused on the specific angle of how transparency plays a role in 
corruption, arguing that corruption is not only an economic phenomenon but also a 
cultural and political one. However, there has been little research concerning 
transparency, Zhao, Kim and Du say. The authors believe that even with an 
increasing interested in the topic of corruption due to the increasing trend of 
globalization and foreign market entry as well as FDI. 
 
Still, despite Zhao, Kim and Du’s argument that there is little data on transparency, 
other literature has focused on the issue. For example, the OECD (2010) reveals that 
in cultures of business environment where there is a lack of transparency efforts to 
combat the corrupt practices are problematic. The article emphasizes that the 
creation and use of important legislation is vital for attracting possible investors. 
Companies and individuals that might invest in a nation are greatly influenced by the 
fact the host country’s government is at least willing to do the effort of putting in place 
legislations and regulations to control actual corruption. Investors are appeased by 
the fact that governmental institutions willing to combat fraud, and are more inclined 
Hegemann, Petra and Berumen, Sergio A. A neoschumpeterian review of the impact of 
corruption on competitiveness and foreign direct investment. 
Papeles de Europa 
22 (2011): 39-60 
44 
to invest if they see that corruption is a concern for the nation. The creation and 
implementation of the legislation may be more important than the actual legislation at 
the time of the investment. It is therefore very important to enforce the legislation 
against corruption as a means of increasing chances of gaining FDI. 
 
One reason why such legislation and the enforcement of it is important, according to 
Habib and Zurawicki (2002), is because investors do tend to shy away from nations 
with reputations for corruption. This authors argue that in general, foreign investors 
avoid corruption due to the view that it is considered wrong. Moreover, foreign 
investors see corruption as leading to a lack of efficiency in operations. However, the 
authors, while creating a link between decision-making and FDI in foreign nations, fail 
to examine the many variables that relate to making choices. Many see corruption as 
negative and suggest that this reduces FDI in some markets, others do not agree 
completely. In fact, Hines (2005) argue that while on one level corruption is viewed in 
a negative manner as it can cost companies a great deal of money in such ways as 
bribery payoffs, there is another side that some see a positive aspect of corruption. 
Egger, Loretz, Pfaffermayr and Winner (2006) state that, using bribes can help 
grease the wheels of commerce. Hence, some companies might find that in paying 
bribes they are able to gain some efficiencies in business such as the ability to gain 
licenses, permits and other permissions more quickly compared to a situation where 
such bribes are not paid. According to Stiglitz (2006), this view of corruption is more 
common in firms related to forestry, mining and sweat mills (overseas 
manufacturing), for corruption will allow them to oversee environmental and labour 
regulations. 
 
Other researchers have also found that some see corruption as necessary. For 
example, according to a Gallup Poll (2006) rampant corruption is seen as one of the 
defining characteristics of the post-communist Russia where corruption has become 
a part of the capitalist culture. The research of the Gallup Poll reveals that many 
Russians see corruption as a major issue in the nation, with 80% of respondents in a 
face-to-face survey saying that yes corruption is widespread in their government 
and/or country. Moreover, an astoundingly low 7% of the Russians surveyed are 
satisfied with the way that corruption is being handled. Still, it seems that corruption 
has become somewhat of a norm in society (see Gradirovski and Esipova, 2006). 
 
Perhaps most important is that additional Gallup (2010) research suggests that in the 
ex Soviet-Union, bribery is not always seen as wrong. In fact, many acts that occur in 
Russia would be considered corrupt under the standards of the Western world, are 
not viewed as such by Russians. Gallup reports that in Russia gifts and services are 
not viewed as corrupt by many Russians. Moreover, due to the fact that many 
Russians have had personal experiences with corruption some have taken a 
nuanced view of its moral standing and role in society. In fact, research conducted by 
Gallup found that forty four percent of those surveyed found that it is morally 
acceptable to use bribery in some cases such as bribing health care practitioners, 
nurses or doctors, to receive better care in medical care facilities. Meanwhile, thirty 
two percent of those surveyed believe that it is morally acceptable to bribe officials in 
academia to have a child admitted to a university or college. Perhaps more troubling 
is that among younger generation Russians, forty two percent consider bribing in 
academic establishments as morally acceptable. 
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Some researchers have examined the concept of how companies might influence 
corruption and FDI. While much of the literature has examined FDI and corruption in 
how the corruption affects the investment of firms, Kwok and Tadesse (2006) 
examine how the presence of multinational corporations shapes institutional 
corruption. The researchers found that the presence of multinational firms in corrupt 
markets can place pressure in terms of regulatory, demonstration and 
professionalisation effects and find that the presence of foreign-owned subsidiaries 
can reduce the level of corruption in a host nation. Regulatory pressures include 
companies, such as those of the United States, having to follow laws of their home 
nation, even overseas such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977 
(see Hines, 2005). As for demonstration effect, the authors agree that locals learn 
from the foreign-owned subsidiaries how business is conducted in a non-corrupt 
manner. Finally, with the professionalisation effect, the authors conclude that 
multinational corporations can reduce corruption in a foreign nation as they can teach 
local workers about running an operation without corruption. 
 
The results of the Kwok and Tadesse (2006) study seem to suggest that surprisingly, 
the entry of a multinational corporation in a foreign nation can have a positive effect 
on corruption over time. The authors believe that the FDI inflows, that come from 
nations where typically there is less corruption, brings its norms with it. As a result, 
with organizations basing their behaviours on norms shaped by their home country’s 
anti-corruption laws, it is expected that the members of the corrupt host nation will 
attempt to copy the norms of the traditional business practices of the foreign 
multinational corporation. 
 
Other studies that have linked corruption to FDI include the work of Weitzel and 
Berns (2006) who in their work on corruption and takeovers discuss how many 
studies assume that foreign firms are outsiders to the corruption of the host nation 
and that several outside firms seek local partners as a means of accessing local 
markets in the host nation. Moreover, the authors state that research has argued that 
corrupt environments do often lead to the need to employ brokers, middlemen and 
local partners, leading to the assumption that the costs of corruption are high. 
Perhaps most important is the affirmation that corruption raises barriers to entry as 
well as barriers of exit in corrupt markets due to the view that partners in corruption 
are often tied to each other even after the exchange of funds and/or goods in the 
corrupt act. 
 
Luo (2006) examines how a multinational corporation that enters a corrupt market 
operates and/or influences the host nation. Luo evaluates the manner in which 
multinational corporations manage both political and social forces in a foreign 
emerging market. Kwok and Tadesse argue that multinational corporations that enter 
nations can reduce over time the corruption levels of the foreign nations. In contrast, 
Luo argues that when the multinational company perceives corruption in the host 
country, the organization’s propensity to cooperate and be forward with the 
government decreases. In fact, the focus that the multinational firm might have on 
such concepts as “goodhearted contributions” might be very negative for they go 
against the foreign company’s ethics. This only drives the managers of the company 
to ignore all governmental issues, and manage their company in their own little 
bubble, and not contributing in any way to reduce the host country’s level of 
corruption. Other findings include that when a multinational corporation finds itself in 
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a nation where it perceives a high level of corruption that it will use bargain at an 
arms length because of the corruption that exists in the country. 
 
Another interesting part in Luo’s research is that the author does reveal the response 
to corruption among multinational companies operating in corrupt markets. The 
author states, for example, that research has found that some companies, as a 
response to corruption, place stress on ethical codes of conduct that their employees 
must comply with. These codes are sometimes used as means to increase the 
workers’ awareness of corruption and can motivate the workers to seek aid in fighting 
back against corruption in a host nation. Some companies, Luo reports, make an 
effort to ensure that workers understand just what corruption is. Overall, Luo does 
examine the response to perceptions of corruption, yet does so not do so in terms of 
FDI and decision-making but in terms of a firm’s ethical codes. 
 
And the research does point to some potential findings. For example, the research 
has suggested that some individuals do not see corruption as being negative but 
simply a part of the status quo, needed in fact to “grease the wheels” to achieve 
business goals. These exact words have been repeated several times. Perhaps a 
change might be welcome here. A suggestion is: However some researchers have 
found that corruption is seen as part of normal business practices in some 
multinational corporations, and that perhaps this a phenomenon related to sector and 
not to nationality. Moreover, the research suggests that many people view corruption 
as a simple part of doing business without much consideration for the ethical issues 
that surround it. Still, the research has also suggested that some firms do respond to 
corruption through focusing on their ethics and working to aid their workers operating 
in corrupt nations of their ethical views and likely the laws that they must follow with 
regard to engaging in corruption even in foreign nations. It becomes clear that 
potential findings of the research may likely vary based on views of corruption and 
ethics and how corruption was perceived to potentially impact the company that has 
made a decision to enter a nation known for corruption. 
 
Despite the failings of the literature the various authors have advanced literature that 
allows one to gain a better understanding of corruption as it occurs in various 
nations, how it affects businesses and economies and to some extent how it affects 
decision making. It becomes clear that the various researchers who have examined 
FDI, corruption and to some extent decision-making, have addressed the issues in a 
variety of ways. However, there is no available literature on the behaviour of foreign 
firms in host countries. There is much difficulty in obtaining this information, but it is 
necessary to do so to find out if those foreign investors have participated in their 
corrupt host country’s fight against corruption. Contrary to public thought, FDI may 
not be the solution to fighting corruption. Observing that there is a gap in the 
literature concerning findings on the above mentioned subject of academic analyses 
of corruption, it will be the aim of this thesis to collect and analyse data to find out 
what the relationship that exists in host countries of FDI and corruption. 
 
2. FDI IMPACT ON CORRUPTION IN THE DEVELOPING 
ECONOMIES 
 
Nowadays it is a given that corruption poses large costs for economic development. 
There have been many studies that have made evident that higher levels of 
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corruption are associated with lower per capita income. A number of recent studies 
have shown that corruption- especially in developing countries- reduces FDI. But 
though most of the focus has been on the extent of foreign investors who have 
stayed away from the developing countries, comparatively little attention has been 
given to the behaviour of those that have invested in those countries. Do foreign 
investors in developing countries import better standards of conduct or do they 
contribute to the problem? Recently a lot of attention has been focused on this and 
many ethics codes and multinational legal restrictions have been put into place to 
encourage investors to meet higher standards of governance than those of the local 
environment. However there is no evidence of how foreign investors act when they 
are far away from home. 
 
Table 1. Domestic and Foreign firms in the survey example. 
Country Total firms 
Domestic 
firms FDI 
FDI 
(%) 
Local 
HQ Foreign HQ 
Albania 160 139 21 71,6 12 9 
Armenia 125 123 2 85 0 2 
Azerbaijan 137 124 13 80,1 12 1 
Belarus 132 117 15 47,7 14 1 
Bulgaria 130 113 17 56,1 17 0 
Croatia 127 110 17 46,1 17 0 
Czech Republic 149 116 33 83,5 24 9 
Estonia 132 106 26 54,7 23 3 
Georgia 129 111 18 50,5 15 3 
Hungary 146 119 27 78,2 26 1 
Kazakhstan 147 120 27 82,9 11 16 
Kyrgyzstan 132 117 15 36,3 14 1 
Latvia 166 125 41 63,5 40 1 
Lithuania 112 106 6 51,3 6 0 
Moldova 138 122 16 66,9 14 2 
Poland 245 205 40 56 37 3 
Romania 125 105 20 56,9 19 1 
Russia 552 515 37 54,6 31 6 
Slovakia 137 122 15 52,9 13 2 
Slovenia 125 108 17 66,9 17 0 
Ukraine 247 217 30 45,3 28 2 
Uzbekistan 126 108 18 49,3 17 1 
Overall 3 619 3 148 471 60,9 407 64 
Source: retrieved from Smarzynska and Wei (2000). 
 
 
Most existing studies of corruption and FDI are based on indices of corruption 
perceptions at the country level. But to assess the way that foreign firms actually 
behave in host countries, internal individual firm data is needed to be able to 
compare the propensity of foreign firms to engage in the country’s corruption versus 
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the propensity of domestic firms to do so. A survey that was conducted by the World 
Bank to 400 firms in 22 developing countries, gives us the necessary data to actually 
get this inside information on the behaviour of foreign firms in host countries (see 
Smarzynska and Wei, 2000). This is the source that will be the most used throughout 
this section to analyse the relationship that exists between foreign firms in corrupt 
developing countries. Thanks to a survey done in the year 1999 by members of the 
World Bank, there is finally a study based on data that was collected from actual 
firms that have had experience in actual corrupt practices. 
 
Table 1 is a summary of the number of firms, domestic and foreign, that were 
analyzed and the countries where they operate in. The survey that was conducted in 
1999–2000, will be a very useful source throughout the research to demonstrate the 
relationship that exists between FDI and corruption. The survey was done for the 
following purpose: “to assess the quality of the business environment, including 
governance and corruption based on the experiences and practices of different 
firms1.” And it was distributed in 22 developing countries, interviewing between 125 
and 150 firms in each country. The survey distinguishes between multinational firms 
whose headquarters are located overseas and FDI firms with local headquarters 
which are in most cases Joint Ventures with a local partner. This difference permits 
the analysis of different types of FDI firms with different behaviours in the countries 
that they operate in. Therefore in this case corruption can be analyzed from the 
perspective of domestic firms versus international ones, as well as among different 
types of foreign firms. 
 
Drabek and Payne (2006) make a distinction between two forms of corruption: 
• State Capture: which they define as the extent to which firms make illicit private 
payments to public servants in order to influence the formation of laws, rules, 
regulations or decrees by government organisations. 
• Public Procurement Kickbacks2: defined as illicit private payments to public 
servants to secure government procurement contracts. 
 
These forms of corruption are not the same as Facilitation Payments. The way that 
Facilitation Payments work, is that the governments extract money from their 
country’s firms, and this money is put into rents (annual or monthly payments, college 
tuition for the children of government officials) that go to public servants that have the 
power to intervene in the market and modify rules and legislations in a way to benefit 
the facilitating firms’ activities. The difference is that State Capture and Public 
Procurement Kickbacks are done for both civil servants and firms to gain rents out of 
                                                 
1
 As many of the forms of corruption examined in the survey are illegal in most countries, firms must 
be expected to be reluctant to admit that they engage in such activities. When the survey was 
conducted, the problems relate with collecting reliable data were in all moment kept in mind, and 
efforts were made to assure the interviewed that theirs answers would be kept confidential. The 
survey questions examine corruption from a number different perspectives, and they were conducted 
to detect any systematic positive or negative bias among the firms in any given country. 
2
 Kickbacks are payments or other types of compensation made in order to influence and gain profit 
from an individual or company. Essentially, kickbacks are bribes. An individual or company uses 
kickbacks to gain an unearned advantage, benefit, or opportunity, even if others are more qualified or 
offer more competitive prices. A relatively simple but serious type of white collar crime, kickbacks hurt 
business by interfering with the functioning of competition in the marketplace (see Drabek and Payne, 
2006). 
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the bribes. In Facilitation Payments only government bureaucrats benefit from the 
rents. Therefore this means that firms are quite willing to participate in State Capture 
and Public Procurement Kickbacks for they will also be getting something out of the 
deal. The major problems with these being, first, that public servants were put into 
position to serve the public not to be served by the public; and second, for each 
corrupt government bureaucrat we need fifteen corrupt private bureaucrats to keep 
him in position, so corruption tends to be a social disease. 
 
The graph above shows the percentage of contract value that foreign firms pay as 
bribes. Implying that French investors would spend 5,6% of the total of their 
investment in paying public officials so that the contracts actually took place. The 
United Kingdom leads the ranking paying 5,9% of the contract value to public 
officials, while Turkey is last spending 1,5% in illicit payments. So Turks are less 
corrupted than their Western counterparts, a major finding about who corrupt who. 
 
Figure 1, which was put in place in the year 2009, indicates that there is practically 
no difference between the percentages that FDI and Domestic firms pay in forms of 
bribes, the first paying 4,7% of the contract value and the second disbursing 4,8%. 
This indicates that both types of firms are exposed to corruption and that they 
participate almost equally in fraudulent acts. As for figure 2 that is below, one can 
clearly see that there is a correlation between firms that make private illicit payments 
to influence laws of a country versus the countries that do not. 
 
Figure 1. Corruption deters foreign investors: probability of investment loss due to 
corruption (within 5 years) 
Source: OECD (2010). 
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Figure 2. Public Procurement Kickback Bribes paid by Firms (% bribe “cut” by Firms 
with FDI for public procurement contracts) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: retrieved from the World Bank (2010a). 
 
 
As is mentioned earlier, State Capture is a type of bribe that economically benefits 
both government officials as well as the firms that make the payment. Figure 2 clearly 
states that when a country has corrupt officials (Capture economy) as well as corrupt 
firms (Captor on the graph), the percentage growth rate of sales is much higher for 
Captor firms than for Non-Captor firms. This means that when in a corrupt nation, if a 
foreign firm is also fraudulent; its growth rate is much higher than if the firm follows 
ethical values. The opposite occurs in non-corrupt economies (Non-Capture 
economies), where non captor firms are far more successful than captor ones. 
 
So it is possible that corrupted people seek their way to find each other, while non-
corrupted people also tend to swarm together. Thus the effect of FDI on local 
corruption can be of minor importance; the important effect being on the type of FDI 
being attracted by lawful nations and by corrupted nations. It can also be the 
incentives to conduct FDI faced by firms in their home countries. If the FDI project is 
to gain efficiency, then a non-capture country will be chosen; if the reason is to avoid 
regulations, then a corrupt country shall be selected. 
 
This demonstrates that corrupt nations actually drive foreign firms into corruption, for 
every businesses’ aim is to increase revenues, and when foreign firms realise that 
the best way to earn more money is by making private payments to modify laws and 
regulations to their own benefit, they do just that. It seems that corrupt governments 
actually encourage foreign firms to participate in corruption instead of foreign firms 
helping developing countries fight bribery. 
 
In the survey given by the World Bank, firms where asked to explain the type of 
bribery that “firms like them” had been involved in. Some of them reported having 
made private payments to public servants for the purpose of influencing the content 
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private payments to public officials to obtain public procurement contracts. Thus a 
large group of kickback firms can be identified in the sample of firms that were 
surveyed. 
 
Table 2 provides data of Captor firms and Kickback firms in each country. The exhibit 
also provides the Average Share of Bribe Payments by firms as a part of their annual 
revenue. To get the results for the first column “Share of Captor firms”, firms were 
asked whether State Capture in each of the following dimensions (parliamentary 
legislation, presidential decrees, central bank, criminal courts, commercial courts, 
political parties) had some kind of impact on their business. Those firms that reported 
a significant or very significant impact were classified as affected by State Capture in 
that dimension. 
 
Table 2. Types and Levels of Corruption in Eastern European Economies. 
Country Share of Captor Firms Share of Kickback Firms 
Average Share of Annual 
Firm Revenues Paid in 
Bribes 
Albania 11 51 4 
Armenia 7 26 4,6 
Azerbaijan 24 52 5,7 
Belarus 2 5 1,3 
Croatia 10 26 1,1 
Czech Republic 7 43 2,5 
Estonia 5 28 1,6 
Georgia 8 18 4,3 
Hungary 4 15 1,7 
Kazakhstan 6 21 3,1 
Kyrgyzstan 7 19 5,3 
Latvia 14 22 1,4 
Lithuania 14 15 2,8 
Moldova 12 9 4 
Poland 9 32 1,6 
Romania 13 39 3,2 
Russia 9 22 2,8 
Slovakia 12 35 2,5 
Slovenia 10 27 1,4 
Ukraine 12 33 4,4 
Uzbekistan 2 24 4,4 
Overall 9,5 26 3 
Source: retrieved from the World Bank (2010b). 
 
 
The second column “Share of Kickback firms” represents those firms that traded with 
the government, and these were asked: how often do firms like yours nowadays 
need to make extra unofficial payments to public officials to gain government 
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contracts? Finally to obtain the numbers in column 3 “Average share of annual firm 
revenues paid in bribes”, it must be explained that the question was asked in terms of 
revenues rather than profits because the estimates of revenues are more reliable. 
“Total payments” refers to total administrative corruption, for the majority of bribe 
payments are for this purpose. 
 
In all of these countries a similar pattern arises: more firms, whether they are foreign 
or domestic, pay Kickbacks rather than State Capture, meaning that in developing 
economies firms are prone to make private payments rather than influence 
government officials to change the law and the rules and regulations (see figure 3). 
They would rather be doing something illicit through the payment of kickback than 
“convince” the government to alter the laws so that their practices are viewed as 
correct. The reason for this attitude is the matter of saving time, rather than waiting 
for laws to pass through parliament to make their business legal. As an explanation 
one might say that “Time is Money”, and the faster something is done, the better, that 
is the reason why Public Procurement Kickbacks seem to be the preferred mode of 
bribery. 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of firms admitting to paying Kickback Bribes by country of FDI 
origin. 
Proportion of Firms
0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8
United Kigdom
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Source: retrieved from Moran (2005). 
 
 
But the interesting finding is that there is no difference whatsoever between foreign 
firms and domestic ones, which goes to demonstrate that foreign firms do not have 
stricter standards of governance for they are participating equally in corruption. This 
also denies that bureaucrats force foreign firms into paying a larger number of bribes 
as well as higher sums simply because, being foreign, they must comply with the 
host country’s rules. All in all, foreign firms and domestic seem to be equally guilty in 
participating in frauds. First time a hear from this from a first world citizen thus my 
congratulations. 
 
3. CORRUPTION BY FDI FIRMS 
 
The question that now arises is the following: Are firms with FDI more or less likely 
than domestic firms to engage in corruption?  A study done by Wei (2003) analyses 
over 400 firms and divides the countries where the firms are located into different 
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categories depending on whether the companies have high or low levels of 
corruption in the three areas that have been discussed above: State Capture, Public 
Procurement Kickbacks and Total Amount of Bribes in annual revenues. 
 
The results of this study reveal an interesting pattern. In terms of level of corruption, 
FDI and domestic firms pay on average a very similar share of their annual revenues 
on bribes. The differences start to appear when the tendency to engage in different 
types of corruption is studied.  FDI firms are a bit more likely than domestic firms to 
pay Kickbacks for performance. The interesting aspect about this is that even though 
there have been recent developments in ethics codes and compliance procedures, 
and anti-corruption conventions have taken place, FDI firms do not demonstrate 
higher standards of behaviour than domestic firms. 
 
As can be seen in figure 4, the study was conducted that reveals that FDI firms, 
whether they have domestic or international headquarters, are more prone to 
participate in paying Kickbacks than local firms. More so, it is the enterprises with 
international headquarters that engage the most in Public Procurement Kickbacks, 
up to a 40% of these firms participate in this type of bribery. With respect to State 
Capture there is also a difference between FDI firms and domestic ones. 
 
In nations with significant State Capture problems FDI firms are almost twice as likely 
as domestic firms to engage in efforts to capture the State. But in countries where 
State Capture is rarely practiced, FDI firms are much less likely than domestic ones, 
as can be seen in figure 5. 
 
The explanation that most would give for this kind of behaviour would be that foreign 
investors might be the bait of the corrupt country’s government officials. It is quite 
possible that in a corrupt environment public servants would discriminatingly ask 
foreign firms with little experience and knowledge of the country for rent. However in 
the analysis of figure 4 this reasoning is rejected, therefore keeping in mind that 
when a FDI firm engages in State Capture there are many benefits for the FDI firm 
itself (which implies that managers often willingly choose to take a corrupt path for 
they shall be very well remunerated in turn), which leads us to believe that it is all a 
strategy formulated by FDI firms to earn greater margins. The aim of any firm is to 
increase shareholder wealth and gain bigger profits, and it seems that FDI firms have 
woven a strategy around corruption to so just that. 
 
Having investigated the comparison between foreign investors and domestic firms, it 
is noted that there are various differences within FDI firms. FDI firms can be divided 
into two categories: those with local headquarters – mainly Joint Ventures with local 
partners- and those with headquarters abroad- mainly establishments of multinational 
firms. Differences are expected in the propensity of these types of firms to engage in 
corruption. 
 
Multinationals usually have greater resources for ethics training and compliance 
procedures; they are more concerned about their reputation and have somewhat 
higher risks of being caught if participating in bribery. In contrast, foreign investors 
often seek local Joint Venture partners who “understand how to get things done” in 
their countries and have more extensive personal networks to facilitate business. 
Such differences affect their tendency of each type of FDI firm to engage in 
corruption. 
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Figure 4. Firms that pay procurement kickbacks (on those that trade with the State) 
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Source: retrieved from the World Bank (2010a). 
 
 
Figure 5. Practice of State Capture in different countries (in high capture countries) 
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Source: retrieved from the World Bank (2010b). 
 
 
Table 3 presents data on the tendency of FDI firms with local headquarters and FDI 
firms with foreign headquarters to engage in State Capture and pay Public 
Procurement Kickbacks, as well as the Total Bribes Paid. Again the data reveals a 
repetitive pattern. FDI firms with local headquarters are much more likely to engage 
in State Capture than those with foreign headquarters, especially in high capture 
countries. The FDI firms with local headquarters also pay considerably higher levels 
of bribes. FDI firms with foreign headquarters are more likely to pay procurement 
Hegemann, Petra and Berumen, Sergio A. A neoschumpeterian review of the impact of 
corruption on competitiveness and foreign direct investment. 
Papeles de Europa 
22 (2011): 39-60 
55 
kickbacks in dealing with the state in highly corrupt environments. Over 50% of the 
FDI firms with foreign headquarters working in highly corrupt countries said that they 
had paid such kickbacks (see figure 6). 
 
Table 3. Characteristics of FDI and corrupt behaviour 
Share of Captors Firms 1 Share of Kickback Firms 2 Total Bribes Paid (as a share of 
annual revenues) 3 
 
All 
Counties 
High 
Capture 
Low 
Capture 
All 
Countries 
High 
Kickbacks 
Low 
Kickbacks 
All 
Countries 
High 
Bribes 
Low 
Bribes 
Domestics 
Firms 9 10,4 7,3 25,2 34 17,5 3 3,8 1,8 
FDI Firms 
Local HQ 12,5 19,9 4,5 28,2 33,3 23,3 3 4,8 1,4 
FDI Firms 
Foreign HQ 5,3 6,3 4,9 36 53,8 16,7 1,3 1,6 0,9 
Source: retrieved from Luo (2009). 
 
 
Figure 6. Practice of State Capture in Different countries: capture economies vs. non 
capture economies. 
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Source: retrieved from the World Bank (2010a). 
 
 
These results suggest that foreign investors might choose the type of corruption to 
engage in on the basis of their comparative advantages. “Local” FDI firms with strong 
contacts in the host country’s political and economic environment choose to seek 
advantages through State Capture (i.e. through influencing the formation of various 
laws, rules and decrees). FDI firms with foreign headquarters have fewer ties and 
contacts in such structures and focus more on private payments to public officials 
and bureaucrats that grant specific contracts in working with the state. This again 
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reflects a more strategic approach to corruption on the part of firms. Up until now it 
seemed that corruption was something general that firms were forced into to be able 
to do business in their host countries. But throughout this investigation it is turning 
out that firms actually study corruption, and employ the form that will give them the 
higher benefit. An inference in the mental height of Dr. Watson! The problem being 
resource deviation from FDI and manufacturing to rent seeking and corruption 
analyses which certainly must diminish resources worldwide and favour income 
concentration at the host country, let alone the development and parliamentary 
approval of competition diminishing institutions. 
 
Corruption is now a state-of-the art, not something to shy away from, simply another 
economic factor that exists in the market where the firm is operating, and like interest 
or exchange rates, firms are managing to use corruption in the way that will 
advantage them the most and lead their business to higher overall revenues. The 
risks that corrupt practices pose are something that the whole world nowadays is 
conscious about. In 1977 the Unites States decided to take some kind of action 
against corruption and the FCPA (v.g. the Act prohibits USA firms from using bribes 
to maintain or secure business in foreign countries) was created (see Hines, 2005). 
More recently, seeing that corruption was becoming a problem closely linked to any 
kind of business in every single country, the OECD created the Convention on 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials that was signed at the end of 1997 (see Oman, 
2000). However very little attention has been paid to these measures and so far they 
have failed to reduce corruption worldwide. 
 
As it has been shown throughout this section, there is significant variation in the 
conduct of foreign investors from different countries with respect to corruption. What 
many believe is that these differences might be related to differences in the 
regulatory environments, meaning that countries with less rigorous standards of 
corporate conduct are more corrupt than others simply because they can get away 
with it. To identify the impact of anti-corruption legislations a study by Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003) was conducted where they divided the countries into three different 
groups: 
• The unregulated countries: those which have no legislation constraining the 
behaviour of their firms in foreign countries. Since all OECD members (and 5 
non-members) signed the Convention, the unregulated countries all come from 
outside the OECD. 
• Those countries that have approved the OECD Convention and those that have 
signed, but not yet ratified it at the time of the survey.3 
• USA firms. These constitute a separate group since that have been subject to the 
FCPA for many years prior to signing and ratifying the OECD Convention. Which 
unfortunately has come to be a major act of hypocrisy, at least as seen from 
Latin America. 
 
The following graphs and figures study the extent to which legislation leads to 
changes in behaviour. Common sense makes one expect that USA firms should be 
the least corrupt, for there have been anti-corruption legislations in their country for 
                                                 
3
 The precise rules concerning the coming into force of the Convention can be found in www.oecd.org. 
For the purpose of this paper, it must be noted that this Convention entered into force with the first 
group of countries on February 15th 1999 and for other countries subsequently as it was ratified 
domestically. 
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the longest period of time, thus punishing those who commit corrupt acts, and, as is 
mentioned above, this supposedly reduces to propensity of firms to engage in 
corruption. Following this line of thought, OECD convention countries would be the 
ones to follow USA enterprises as the least likely to engage in corrupt acts due to the 
convention signed at the end of 1997 therefore leaving Unregulated Countries last as 
the most corrupt (OECD, 2009). 
 
Table 4 examines the conduct of foreign investors and the relationship with anti-
corruption legislation, together with the corresponding results for the whole group of 
foreign investors and the domestic firms for comparison. The hypothesis that 
legislation constrains the behaviour of foreign investors should be confirmed by 
showing lower results of corruption by USA firms (column 4), then by OECD 
Convention Countries (column 2) and leaving Unregulated Countries the ones with 
the higher percentages of corruption. Surprisingly this pattern does not emerge, and, 
in fact, the US investors, supposedly the most constrained, do not show lower levels 
of corruption than either OECD Convention countries or the Unregulated countries, 
and in some cases appear to be significantly higher. USA (FCPA) firms rank highest 
in “Share of Kickback Firms” with 42,7% and also lead the group in “Number of 
Observations” with 63% versus 60% in Unregulated Countries and 31% in OECD 
Convention Countries. USA firms actually rank second in Total Bribes Paid. 
 
Table 4. Legislation in Source Country and corrupt behavior 
FDI Source Country 
(by anti-corruption legislation) 
Unregulated 
Countries 
OECD 
Convention 
Countries * 
FCPA 
(United States) 
All FDI 
Firms 
Domestic 
Firms 
Total Bribes Paid 4,7 2,3 3,6 2,8 3 
Share of Captor Firms 16,7 9,8 16,7 11,5 9 
Share of Kickback Firms 31,8 27,3 42,9 29,2 25,2 
Number of Observations 60 310 63 471 3148 
* excludes US firms. 
Source: retrieved from OECD (2009). 
 
 
Table 5 makes these claims more statistically precise, by computing pair wise 
significance tests for the difference between the level of corruption among the 
various groups. These tests confirm that neither US firms nor firms from the OECD 
Convention Countries exhibit lower propensity than firms from Unregulated Countries 
to engage in these common forms of corruption, though total bribe payments from 
OECD Convention countries are generally lower, USA firms do not exhibit lower 
levels of corruption, in fact following these tables, in some cases they show higher 
levels. Thus regulation has, up to now, a minor influence; so once again incentives 
should be looked at. 
 
Table 5. Comparison of legislation in source country and corrupt behavior 
 
Share of Captors 
Firms 
Share of Kickback 
Firms 
Total Bribes Paid (% 
of annual revenues) 
Unregulated Countries OECD 
Convention Countries 
16,7 
9,8 
31,8 
27,3 
4,7 ** 
2,3 
Unregulated Countries FCPA 
(USA) 
16,7 
16,7 
31,8 
42,9 
4,7 
3,6 
OECD Convention Countries 
FCPA USA) 
9,8 
16,7 
27,3 
42,9 
2,3 
3,6 ** 
Source: retrieved from OECD (2009). 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In countries where the government encourages “donations” and “gifts” from private 
companies, FDI firms are more likely than their domestic counterparts to engage in 
corrupt forms of political influence, known as State Captures. Different types of 
foreign investors engage in particular types of corruption, depending on what 
competitive advantage they will get out of it. FDI firms with local partners are more 
likely to engage in State Capture. Larger multinational firms with headquarters 
overseas rely much less on State Capture, yet are more likely to resort to political 
corruption and bribery, Kickbacks, in their dealing with foreign States. 
Though quite often, foreign direct investors might claim that they are specifically 
targeted for bribes by local governments, it has been found that there is no evidence 
that FDI firms pay higher overall bribes than domestic firms, even though they are 
more likely to engage in specific forms of corruption. Moreover, it has been 
demonstrated that foreign investors actually earn high returns on corrupt acts, 
meaning that FDI firms actually receive a substantial amount of the rents from 
corruption. This evidence therefore rejects the view that foreign investors are forced 
into paying bribes. Following the evidence collected in a survey conducted in 1999-
2000, legal acts to prevent bribery, such as the USA FCPA and the OECD 
Convention on Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, have not led to higher standards of 
corporate conduct among foreign investors. 
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